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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, the United States Supreme Court has
shown a strong and growing interest in patent law and, in particu-
lar, the standards for reviewing patent law issues promulgated by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Most of
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the time, the Supreme Court has rejected the Federal Circuit's ten-
dency to create bright-line tests.1
One important aspect of patent law is the duty of patent appli-
cants to disclose material information to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) during the patent application ex-
amination process.2 The intentional failure to disclose material in-
formation or an attempt to mislead the USPTO may result in a
party alleging inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringe-
ment if litigation is commenced.3 Inequitable conduct is a Supreme
Court-created doctrine based in equity that is available to the par-
ties challenging a patent in litigation.4 This defense finds its roots
in the unclean hands doctrine, as well as common law fraud.5 The
defense is often used in patent litigation because it can result in an
1. See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation ofPatent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413,
1417, 1424-27 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court's treatment of the Federal Circuit's
patent law decisions shows a "holistic orientation as a generalist court concerned with legal
consistency and policy considerations that range beyond the specialized patent system");
Richard Linn, Changing Times: Changing Demands, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011)
(Federal Circuit Judge Linn noting that "the Supreme Court is reminding ... [the Federal
Circuit] that it, and not the Federal Circuit, has the final say and is giving us guidance that
promoting uniformity in patent decisions does not mean creating patent-specific, bright-line
rules outside the mainstream of federal law"); Kathleen M. O'Malley, The Intensifying Na-
tional Interest in Patent Litigation, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2015) (discussing
the Supreme Court's increased interest in the Federal Circuit's patent cases); Steven Sei-
denberg, Tug-of-War over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues Between Federal Circuit
and SCOTUS, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug-of-
war over interpretations-of patent law continues between federal (discussing three
trends with respect to the Supreme Court's review of Federal Circuit patent decisions: 1.
cutting back on patent protection, 2. rejecting bright-line tests for patent law, and 3. rejecting
special rules for patent law jurisprudence).
2. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (Applicable federal regulation requires that "[e]ach in-
dividual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of can-
dor and good faith in dealing with the . . . [USPTO], which includes a duty to disclose to the
... [USPTO] all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as de-
fined in this section.").
3. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
4. Id. at 1285. The trilogy of cases that form the genesis for the inequitable conduct
doctrine are: Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945);
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on other
grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); Keystone Driller Co. v.
Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
5. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285, 1287. Unclean hands is a common law defense that is
based in equity and requires that a party seeking redress in court must come to that court
with clean hands. See, e.g., Keystone, 290 U.S. at 244-45. Typically, common law fraud has
the following elements: "(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that repre-
sentation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so reckless as to the conse-
quences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation by the party deceived which induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury
to the party deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation." Norton v. Curtiss,
433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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entire patent, or patent family, being held unenforceable as com-
pared with other defenses that typically result in individual patent
claims being held invalid.6 It can also result in patent misuse and
antitrust counterclaims being brought against the party asserting
the patent.
7
Modification of the Therasense standard is appropriate in view of
the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc., and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., in which the Supreme Court rejected other patent re-
lated Federal Circuit objective/subjective two prong standards, as
well as the guidance provided by eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.8
Some form of a totality of the circumstances standard should be ap-
plied to inequitable conduct that is more akin to the unclean hands
doctrine and provides greater flexibility and discretion to district
courts in what to consider as well as what remedy to impose. In
both Halo Electronics and Octane, the Supreme Court reviewed the
Federal Circuit's two prong bright-line objective/subjective tests
and rejected those tests in favor of more holistic tests.9 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly rejected the Federal Circuit's special
patent law standards and has, on numerous occasions, instructed
the Court of Appeals to root its tests in the general body of jurispru-
dence.10
In Therasense, the Federal Circuit articulated a much stricter,
inflexible, inequitable conduct standard.11 This standard provides
very little discretion to the district court both in what to look at and
the remedy to impose.12 The Therasense inequitable conduct stand-
ard is out of step with the recent case law of the Supreme Court.
Arguably, the Therasense decision pays, at best, passing homage to
6. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288.
7. Id. at 1289.
8. Halo Elec, Inc. v. Pulse Elec, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
9. Halo Electronics, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33, 1935-36; Octane, 572 U.S. at 550, 552-53; see
also Lee, supra note 1, at 1424 ("[T]he Supreme Court has consistently embraced holistic
standards over formalistic rules. As many commentators have observed, Federal Circuit pa-
tent doctrine generally takes the form of bright-line rules .... In its recent patent decisions,
however, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected formalistic rules in favor of holistic
standards.") (footnotes omitted); Linn, supra note 1, at 7 (Federal Circuit Judge Richard Linn
stating, "[flor the Supreme Court, bright-line rules are seldom endorsed.").
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.




the fact that the inequitable conduct is a doctrine that is based in
the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.
13
There is no reason why the inequitable conduct standard could
not provide greater flexibility and discretion to district courts in not
only what to consider, but also in what remedy to fashion.1 4 The
Supreme Court has not heard an inequitable conduct case in many
years, but given recent Supreme Court patent decisions and the
Court's heightened interest in patent jurisprudence, the time may
be ripe for another Federal Circuit standard to fall under the Su-
preme Court's gavel. The purpose of this article is to examine
whether the standard for inequitable conduct set forth in the Fed-
eral Circuit's en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickin-
son and Co. should be modified or overruled.15 Part 11 of this article
introduces the doctrine of inequitable conduct and briefly discusses
how the test of inequitable conduct has evolved. Part III reviews
some of the cases that the Supreme Court has heard on appeal from
the Federal Circuit and why the Federal Circuit's tests were va-
cated or overruled. Part IV provides the analysis of why the Federal
Circuit's two elements-one objective and the other subjective-for
inequitable conduct may not be the appropriate standard for this
defense.
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A. Inequitable Conduct-Setting the Stage
The defense of inequitable conduct is based on the duty of candor,
good faith, and honesty that patent applicants, their assignees, and
their attorneys have with respect to what is disclosed to the
USPTO.16 In simple terms, the party applying for a patent must
disclose to the USPTO all the material information it is aware of
13. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct in Retrospective:
Understanding Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1441, 1488 (2013)
("[T]he majority in Therasense disregarded the elements of the unclean-hands doctrine, as
well as the district court's discretion to determine them.").
14. See discussion infra Section IV.
15. For an in-depth article on Therasense and inequitable conduct as the unclean hands
doctrine, see Anenson & Mark, supra note 13, at 1441.
16. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012); see also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945) ("Public interest demands that all facts relevant to such
matters be submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence."); Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
DONALD S. CHISUM, 4 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.03[4] (2019).
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during the patent prosecution process.17 This duty of candor is typ-
ically transgressed when a patent applicant intentionally does not
submit a material reference to the USPTO, or makes a false or mis-
leading statement to the USPTO during patent prosecution.18 In
the late 1980s, the USPTO changed its rules such that it would no
longer investigate inequitable conduct concerns during patent pros-
ecution, as it was not an appropriate venue for making such find-
ings.19 Thus, the duty of candor is an important requirement for
patent applicants in that there is a strong public interest in protect-
ing the integrity of the patenting process and in preventing the en-
forcement of a patent that was procured by fraud.
20
A party that alleges inequitable conduct during litigation must
provide clear and convincing evidence of both the materiality of the
information and the intent to withhold such material information.21
If the evidence meets this threshold, then the district court judge
must weigh the evidence presented and determine if equities war-
rant a conclusion of inequitable conduct.22 The conclusion is at the
17. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179 ("Information is 'material' when there is a substantial ikeli-
hood that a reasonable [patent] examiner would have considered the information important
in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."); see also generally DONALD
S. CHISUM, 6A CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 19.03A, 19.03B (2019).
18. McKesson Info. Sols., Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Typically, the misconduct takes places before the USPTO, however, a recent Federal Circuit
decision has opened up the possibility that the misconduct may include litigation misconduct.
See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1356-57, 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
19. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1448 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]. MPEP section
2010 states:
[T]he [USPTO examiner] does not investigate and reject original or reissue ap-
plications under 37 CFR [§] 1.56. Likewise, the [examiner] will not comment
upon duty of disclosure issues which are brought to the attention of the [USPTO]
... except to note, in appropriate circumstances, that such issues are not con-
sidered by the [examiner] during examination of patent applications.
Id. § 2010.
20. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012); Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor:
Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 330 (2011).
21. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b), inequitable conduct must be plead with
particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) states "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Id.; see also
Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "[T]he
pleading must identify the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrep-
resentation or omission [was] committed before the PTO." Id. at 1328. Intent may be gen-
erally averred, but the pleading must include sufficient allegations of fact that a court may
reasonably infer that "a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or
of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented this in-
formation with a specific intent to deceive the PTO." Id. at 1328-29; see also Therasense, Inc.
v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating that
"[i]ntent and materiality are separate requirements").
22. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287. Materiality and intent are factual issues reviewed on
appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. See JP Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd.,
Duquesne Law Review
sole discretion of the judge, and it is reviewed on appeal under an
abuse of discretion standard.
23
Inequitable conduct is a well-discussed topic in patent literature
and the available materials on the subject are vast.24 Since 1982,
the Federal Circuit has several times modified the metes and
bounds of the inequitable standard, but has always maintained it
as a two-prong test based on materiality of the information and in-
tent of the patent applicant.25 The Federal Circuit for several dec-
ades has been concerned about the proliferation of inequitable con-
duct claims in patent litigation.26 At various times the court has
called it the "atomic bomb" of patent litigation and a "plague" on the
patent system.27 In 1988, the Federal Circuit attempted to address
the far too common practice of alleging inequitable conduct in pa-
tent litigations in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister
Inc.28 In Kingsdown, the Federal Circuit held that more than gross
negligence was needed in order to show intent to deceive and artic-
ulated a "sufficient culpability" standard for the intent prong of in-
equitable conduct.29 However, over the next several years, Federal
Circuit decisions backed away from the "sufficient culpability"
standard and eventually went back to a negligence or "should have
known" standard.30 To date, the Federal Circuit's efforts, as re-
flected in its decisions, to curtail inequitable conduct allegations in
patent litigation have had little impact.31 The ebb and flow of the
wording around the two-prong test before Therasense need not be
Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A court's determination of inequitable conduct is
reviewed as a matter of law. Id.
23. Regeneron, 864 F.3d at 1364.
24. CHISUM, supra note 17, at § 19.03A n.11.
25. See Zhe (Amy) Peng et al., A Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown
Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform,
16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 373, 376-80 (2011).
26. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287-90; Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Federal Circuit Judge Rich noting that inequitable conduct "in
the PTO' has been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up
the patent system").
27. See Randall R. Rader, Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM. U.
L. REV. 777, 779 (2010) (discussing inequitable conduct frequency and citing to Stanford In-
tellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse statistics from 2004 to 2008); see also The-
rasense, 649 F.3d at 1288-89 (Chief Judge Rader discussing inequitable conduct issues).
28. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
29. Id. at 876 (Chief Judge Markey stated that the Federal Circuit "adopt[s] the view
that a finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself justify
an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence,
including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a
finding of intent to deceive").
30. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1239-40
(Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Peng et al., supra note 25, at 377-79.
31. See Peng et al., supra note 25, at 387-90.
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addressed in great detail because our focus is on the present The-
rasense standard.
32
B. Inequitable Conduct and the Federal Circuit's Current Stand-
ard
At present, to establish the defense of inequitable conduct a party
attacking a patent must show that when the patent application was
pending before the USPTO, or before the patent was issued, the ap-
plicant: (1) withheld or misrepresented material information to the
USPTO (objective element), and (2) did so with the intent to deceive
the USPTO (subjective element).33 "[T]he materiality required to
establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality," which means
that if the USPTO had been aware of the information withheld or
misrepresented, then the USPTO would not have allowed the pa-
tent application.34 With respect to the intent element, the finder of
fact must find that the party asserting the defense has proven by
"clear and convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the [ma-
terial information], knew that it was material, and made a deliber-
ate decision to withhold it." 35 In addition, Therasense recognized an
exception to the but-for materiality prong in cases of "affirmative
egregious misconduct," such as false affidavits, submitting false ev-
idence, perjury, suppression of evidence, and bribery.
36
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
SUPREME COURT
A. The Troubled Relationship
For more than a decade, the Supreme Court has shown a strong
and growing interest in patent law issues and, in particular, the
patent law standards of the Federal Circuit.37 Most of the time, the
Supreme Court has rejected the Federal Circuit's tendency to create
32. Excellent summaries of the history to the ebb and flow of the two-prong inequitable
conduct test are provided in the literature. See id. at 376-80; Eric E. Johnson, The Case for
Eliminating Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Defense, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7-12
(2017).
33. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
34. Id. at 1291.
35. Id. at 1290.
36. Id. at 1292-93.
37. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 1421-25 (discussing the Supreme Court's negative
treatment of Federal Circuit patent law decisions); Seidenberg, supra note 1 (discussing the
same).
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bright-line patent law tests in favor of application of more general
law-based tests.
38
Congress created the Federal Circuit with the passage of the Fed-
eral Courts Improvement Act of 1982, which merged the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate di-
vision of the United States Court of Claims.3 9 The Federal Circuit
has almost exclusive national jurisdiction over patent law-based is-
sues that are appealed.40 Prior to 2005, the Supreme Court pretty
much left the decisions of the Federal Circuit stand and did not re-
view many decisions of this appeals court.41 However, in 2005, the
Supreme Court's deference changed. Since 2005, the Supreme
Court has reviewed over twenty-seven patent cases and in most of
them have reversed the Federal Circuit.42 The Federal Circuit has
replaced the Ninth Circuit as the most reversed circuit court in the
United States.43 For example, in 2017 alone, the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit's precedent on venue, laches, and pa-
tent exhaustion.44 Some of these Federal Circuit standards of re-
view had been part of the body of case law for decades.45 The total-
ity of the Supreme Court decisions reversing or vacating Federal
Circuit decisions, and the analysis of those decisions are beyond the
scope of this article.46 However, an earlier Supreme Court decision
38. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 1417, 1424-25; Linn, supra note 1, at 7 (Federal Circuit
Judge Linn noting that "the Supreme Court ... and not the Federal Circuit, has the final say
... in patent decisions"); Seidenberg, supra note 1.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1801 (2013).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
41. Peter Lee, Patent Law and Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 42 (2010); Seidenberg,
supra note 1.
42. Seidenberg, supra note 1; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 39, at 1802; Lee, supra note
41, at 27-28, 46-47 (comparing the Supreme Court decisions that favor "holistic" standards
over formalistic rules as favored by the Federal Circuit in various areas of patent law); O'Mal-
ley, supra note 1.
43. Seidenberg, supra note 1.
44. See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954
(2017) (laches in patent cases); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 1514 (2017) (venue); Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (pa-
tent exhaustion); see also Ryan Davis, The Biggest Patent Cases of 2017, LAW360 (Dec. 7,
2017, 12:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/992374/the-biggest-patent-cases-of-2017.
45. See Davis, supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 967 (laches defense to patent infringement not
available within six-year time limit); Teva Pharm. USA v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842
(2015) (factual findings underlying claim construction should be reviewed on appeal for clear
error); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (rejecting the machine or transformation test as
the sole test for processes under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (addressing patent exhaustion limits on patent rights); Medlm-
mune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (reviewing subject-matter jurisdiction in
a declaratory judgment); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005)
(examining 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) infringement exemption and rejecting bright-line
rule); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (addressing
Inequitable Conduct
provides insight into how the Supreme Court might view and artic-
ulate a standard for inequitable conduct.
B. eBay Inc. is Instructive in Setting Patent Law Tests
In 2006, the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. vacated the Federal Cir-
cuit's standard for granting permanent injunctions in patent in-
fringement cases.47 Before eBay Inc., under the Federal Circuit case
law, district courts routinely granted a permanent injunction when
a patent holder prevailed in a patent infringement suit, absent
some exceptional circumstances.48 The Supreme Court rejected this
test and held that like other litigants seeking the equitable relief of
a permanent injunction, the patentee must meet a four-prong test.
49
Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court in a short opin-
ion, stated that the party asserting the patent must show: (1) that
they have suffered irreparable injury; (2) that money damages are
not adequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, balancing the
hardships between the patentee and the infringer, a remedy in eq-
uity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
harmed by granting a permanent injunction.50 In admonishing the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held "that the decision whether
to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discre-
tion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exer-
the prosecution history estoppel doctrine); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17 (1997) (examining patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and
rejecting prosecution estoppel bright-line test); cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014) (Supreme Court rejecting the Federal Circuit's broader indefinite-
ness test as confusing and providing a more narrow reasonably certain test for definiteness
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012)).
47. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The amount of commentary
on this landmark patent decision is vast in that it significantly altered the granting of per-
manent injunctions in patent cases. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS §
20.04[2] (2019); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Land-
scape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. SC. & TECH. 543 (2008); Ryan T. Holte, The Misin-
terpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent,
and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677, 679 n.2 (2015); Lee, supra note 1, at 1438-39; Sue Ann
Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: Traditional Four-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to
Patent, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529 (2007); Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement After
eBay v. Mercexchange, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 235 (2006).
48. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Be-
cause the 'right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property,'
the general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged."); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has indicated that an injunction should issue once infringement
has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it.").
49. eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.
50. Id.
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cised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent dis-
putes no less than in other cases governed by such standards."
51
The Supreme Court also stated that a major departure from these
long standing principles of equity is not to be undertaken lightly.
52
It is worth pointing out that the tradition of routinely granting
permanent injunctions in patent cases had been in existence for
decades and that the Federal Circuit was, in its defense, only car-
rying on that tradition.53 However, the Supreme Court rejected this
rigid test.54 The Supreme Court may be read as conveying a mes-
sage to the Federal Circuit. Patent law and patent law standards
are not to be treated as exceptions to the general body of jurispru-
dence including the principles of law and equity enshrined in that
general body of case law.
55
51. Id. at 394.
52. Id. at 391-92. By citing to and relying on 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952), the Supreme Court
also noted that nothing in the Patent Act of 1952 indicated that Congress did not intend such
a departure. Id.
53. See Holte, supra note 47; see also Justin McCabe, Patents and Preliminary Injunc-
tions-Federal Circuit Continues Giveaways to Big Business, DUNKIEL SAUNDERS (Oct. 26,
2012), http://www.dunkielsaunders.com/patents-and-preliminary-injunctions-federal-circuit
-continues-giveaways-to-big-business.
54. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393-94. Two other examples of the earlier Supreme Court
decisions rejecting the Federal Circuit's tendency to adopt rigid patent standards are: KSR
Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). In KSR, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
rejected the Federal Circuit's test for determining obviousness, which instructed that for a
patent claim to be obvious, there should be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to com-
bine prior art to come up with the claimed inventions. 550 U.S. at 415-16. The Supreme
Court rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid approach to obviousness. Id. The Supreme Court
noted that a more flexible approach was preferred and other factors other than a motivation
to combine prior art may exist, such as "background knowledge possessed by a person having
ordinary skill in the art" and "inferences and creative steps a person of ordinary skill in the
art would employ." Id. at 401. In Festo, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, re-
jected the Federal Circuit's en banc test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
as too rigid. 535 U.S. at 739-41. The Federal Circuit held that no range of equivalents existed
when a patentee narrowed a claim limitation during prosecution. Id. at 727-28. The Su-
preme Court held that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may be available to
claim limitations narrowed during patent prosecution if the equivalent at issue meets one of
the three tests: unforeseeable, "no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in ques-
tion" and "amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent."
Id. at 725, 738-41.
55. See Lee, supra note 1, at 1438-39; O'Malley, supra note 1, at 10 (Federal Circuit Judge
O'Malley stated in a paper based on a lecture that "the Supreme Court has been telling the
Federal Circuit that, as an Article III court, it is bound by the same civil rules, jurisdictional
standards, and common law principles that govern all Article III courts -- in other words,
that patent litigation must be treated like all other litigation.").
Inequitable Conduct
IV. THERASENSE-INEQUITABLE CONDUCT STANDARD: REVISIT,
REVISE, OR OVERRULE?
A. Therasense and What is Wrong
Under Therasense, inequitable conduct requires a showing that
the patent applicant: (1) withheld or misrepresented "material" in-
formation to the USPTO (objective element), and (2) did so with the
"intent" to deceive the USPTO (subjective element).56 Clear and
convincing evidence is needed for both prongs of this test, and there
is no sliding scale, as had been previously permitted.57 "In other
words, the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it. ' 'S The
same would hold for misleading or false information. The majority
stated that it was tightening "the standards for finding both intent
and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been over-
used to the detriment of the public."
59
The Federal Circuit should reconsider its inequitable conduct
standard articulated in Therasense and apply the Supreme Court's
reasoning and analysis set out for fee shifting in exceptional cases
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012),60 and for increasing patent damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).61 In addition, the Federal Circuit
should take into account the Supreme Court's guidance provided in
eBay Inc., namely, that bright-line patent standards are not favored
in application of equitable doctrines and treatment of such patent
law issues should follow well-established principles of equity found
in the general body of case law.6 2 If the Federal Circuit is not will-
ing to reexamine its inequitable conduct standard, then the Su-
preme Court should consider granting certiorari in an appropriate
56. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
57. Id. at 1288. In the 1980s, the Federal Circuit placed "intent" and "materiality" on a
"sliding scale," so if there was a strong showing of intent coupled with a weak showing of
materiality (or vice versa), inequitable conduct could be established. See Am. Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
58. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. The Federal Circuit also made it clear that "in as-
sessing the materiality of a withheld reference, the court must determine whether the PTO
would have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference." Id. at 1291.
59. Id. at 1290; see also supra Sections II.A & B. Thirty-four amicus curiae briefs were
filed in the Therasense appeal. See Joy Lynn Bala, Amicus Briefs: Sounding Offon Reforming
Inequitable Conduct, 45 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 125, 143 (2011). There is little doubt that virtually
the entire patent bar had a strong interest in what the Federal Circuit would do with ineq-
uitable conduct and still does today.
60. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
61. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
62. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
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case and overruling or modifying the Federal Circuit's present in-
equitable conduct standard63 because this standard is arguably not
consistent with the Supreme Court's current case law on such equi-
table and discretionary doctrines.6 4 The courts should determine
inequitable conduct in patent cases under some form of a totality of
the circumstances standard. In addition, the standard should pro-
vide more deference to the district court's findings and conclusions,
as well as provide the district court with more flexibility in what is
and is not inequitable conduct. I do not advocate for or suggest that
establishing inequitable conduct should be made easier, but rather
the contrary, in that I propose the standard should be more akin to
the unclean hands doctrine.
B. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. Provides
Guidance
The Supreme Court has often chastised the Federal Circuit for
its overuse of formulaic rigid standards on a range of patent law
issues.6 5 In Octane, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled the
63. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in 2013 and
2015. See Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2868 (June 22, 2015) (No. 14-1304). In its petition, Apotex argued that its "case is a perfect
example of how inequitable conduct has strayed from this Court's precedents-and how much
this Court's guidance is needed after the 70-plus years since it last addressed the precursor
to that doctrine." Brief for Petitioner at 32, Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 2015 WL 1951862 (2015)
(No. 14-1304). However, the questions presented were narrow in scope and did not challenge
the Federal Circuit's standard for inequitable conduct. In Sony, the petition was much
broader and argued some of the points raised in this article. Brief for Petitioner, Sony Com-
put. Ent. Am., Inc. v. 1st Media, LLC, 2013 WL 859981 (2013) (No. 12-1086). The petition
was denied. 1st Media, LLC v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am., Inc., 694 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 418 (Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-1086).
64. See, e.g., Anenson & Mark, supra note 13, at 1444 ("The Therasense majority's rejec-
tion of the history of inequitable conduct contravenes the last word of the Supreme Court on
the defense in patent law, contradicts its more recent precedent on patent remedies, and
departs from the Court's equitable defense jurisprudence in other statutory contexts.").
65. See, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 ("According to well-established principles of eq-
uity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court
may grant such relief .... The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act
of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.
These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.")
(internal citations omitted). See also SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017). In SCA Hygiene, the Supreme Court ruled that laches
defense is not available as a defense to damages for patent infringements that take place
within the six-year limit of 35 U.S.C. § 286. Id. at 967. The 2017 SCA Hygiene decision is
another decision in a line of cases, including Octane and Halo Electronics, where the Supreme
Court affirmed that "[p]atent law is governed by the same common-law principles, methods
of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil litigation." Id. at 964
(quoting Judge Hughes' concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion in SCA Hygiene
Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2015)).
Inequitable Conduct
Federal Circuit's standard for awarding attorney fees to a prevail-
ing party in a patent case where the case had been found excep-
tional under 35 U.S.C. § 285.66 Section 285 of the patent statutes
states that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party."6 7 The Federal Circuit's test
for determining if fee shifting was appropriate under 35 U.S.C. §
285 was first articulated in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing v. Du-
tailer International Inc.
68
In Brooks, the Federal Circuit stated that under 35 U.S.C. § 285,
"[a] case may be deemed exceptional when there has been some ma-
terial inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation, such
as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring
the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified
litigation, conduct that violates [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
11, or like infractions.'6 9 The Court of Appeals further observed,
"[a]bsent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the
patent," fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 "may be imposed against the
patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad
faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.' 70 In other words,
the Federal Circuit applies a "misconduct" standard.71 If that
standard not met, then the court applies a two-part test: the first
part is subjective, and the second part is objective.7 2 Several years
later, in iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., the Federal Circuit further elab-
orated on the Brooks Furniture standard.73 "[T]he plaintiffs case
must have no objective foundation, and the plaintiff must actually
know this. Both the objective and subjective prongs of Brooks Fur-
niture 'must be established by clear and convincing evidence.'' 74
66. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014).
It should be noted that Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the court except for footnotes 1-3.
Id. The Supreme Court also decided on the same day a companion case under 35 U.S.C. §
285 (2012), Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 562 (2014), that
applied the standard set forth in Octane.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
68. Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailer Int'l. Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Under
35 U.S.C. § 285, the award of attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Superior
Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("A district court abuses its dis-
cretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, is based on erroneous
interpretations of the law, or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary[,] or fanciful.").




73. iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011).




In Octane, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
Brooks Furniture standard as being "unduly rigid" in that "it im-
permissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district
courts."75  The Supreme Court held that an exceptional case is
"simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substan-
tive strength of a party's litigating position ... or the unreasonable
manner in which the case was litigated. '76 The Court additionally
gave much greater deference to the district court and instructed the
district court to consider 35 U.S.C. § 285 assertions on a "case-by-
case" basis in light of "the totality of the circumstances."
77
The Supreme Court further criticizes the Federal Circuit in Oc-
tane as imposing "an inflexible framework onto statutory text that
is inherently flexible."78  The Supreme Court noted that before
Brooks Furniture the Federal Circuit had been following the totality
of the circumstances standard under 35 U.S.C. § 285, but that it
abandoned this "holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more rigid
and mechanical formulation. '79 The Supreme Court also rejected
clear and convincing evidence as the evidentiary standard for pa-
tent litigants establishing entitlement fees.80 "Section 285 demands
a simple discretionary inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary
burden, much less such a high one. Indeed, patent-infringement
litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.' 81
C. Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. Provides Fur-
ther Guidance
In Halo Electronics, the Supreme Court built on the equitable,
flexible case-by-case approach articulated in Octane.8 2 Under 35
U.S.C. § 284, in a case involving patent infringement, the court
"may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.'8 3 However, under the Federal Circuit's two-part test in
75. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553, 557 (2014).
76. Id. at 554.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 555.
79. Id. at 550.
80. Id. at 557.
81. Id.
82. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-35 (2016).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). Section 284 states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages ade-
quate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the
court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up
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In re Seagate Tech, LLC, damages may be increased under 35
U.S.C. § 284 only if the patent owner can show by clear and con-
vincing evidence both that "the infringer acted despite an objec-
tively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a
valid patent" and that the risk of infringement "was either known
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused in-
fringer. '8 4 Only after both prongs of the test have been satisfied is
the district court allowed to proceed with determining if it should
exercise its discretion and enhance damages.8 5 Under this Federal
Circuit standard, the objective recklessness is reviewed de novo; the
second part, "subjective knowledge," is reviewed for substantial ev-
idence.86 A decision to award enhanced damages is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.
8 7
Upon review, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, de-
termined that the Seagate test was "unduly rigid, and it impermis-
sibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district
courts.18 8 The Supreme Court concluded that such a test "can have
the effect of insulating some of the worst patent infringers from any
liability for enhanced damages.'8 9 The Supreme Court held that a
district court under 35 U.S.C. § 284 has the discretion to award en-
hanced damages against patent infringers but only in those "egre-
gious" cases where the infringer's misconduct goes beyond typical
infringement.9° For example, the infringer is guilty of willful mis-
conduct or some other appropriate bad act.91
D. The Conflict between Therasense and Supreme Court Prece-
dent
Since its inception, the Federal Circuit has struggled with artic-
ulating the appropriate standard for finding inequitable conduct in
a patent case.92 Inequitable conduct is, at its heart, an equitable
to three times the amount found or assessed. Increased damages under this par-
agraph shall not apply to provisional rights under section 154(d).
Id. (emphasis added).
84. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
85. Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1930.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1932 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S.
545, 551 (2014)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1935.
91. Id. Additionally, in Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1935-36, the Supreme Court also va-
cated and remanded a companion appeal, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), under the same reasoning applied in Halo Electronics.
92. See supra Section II.A and the discussion reviewing the inequitable conduct standard
and its ebbs and flows over time.
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doctrine based on a patentee having unclean hands and not meeting
the duty of disclosure before the USPTO, during the prosecution of
the patent, or committing some other bad act.93 The words "inequi-
table conduct" do not appear in the Patent Act of 1952.94 This de-
fense originated in large part because of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals' decision in Norton v. Curtiss.
95
The majority in Therasense xplained that inequitable conduct
has evolved from three Supreme Court cases that applied unclean
hands in patent contexts that involved egregious conduct.96 Chief
Judge Rader, the author of the Therasense opinion, goes on to ex-
plain that inequitable conduct had evolved to encompass a much
"broader scope of misconduct . . . diverged from the doctrine of un-
clean hands."97 According to Chief Judge Rader, it evolved to in-
clude "the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO . . . [and]
diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by adopting a different
and more potent remedy-unenforceability of the entire patent ra-
ther than mere dismissal of the instant suit. s98 It is not entirely
clear if Chief Judge Rader is providing rationale to support the test
articulated in Therasense or just explaining the evolution of the in-
equitable conduct test. Either way, the Court of Appeals' reasoning
still misses the point. First, this rationale is characterizing patent
law issues as in need of special rules and tests, which is exactly
what the Supreme Court has strongly discouraged.99
Second, there is no reason why inequitable conduct has to result
in the remedy of the entire patent being held unenforceable.100
93. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) (2012) states that unenforceability (unclean hands) is a defense
to patent infringement, however, the statute does not indicate a remedy. See also The-
rasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1299 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(discussing that unenforceability in § 282(b)(1) is a codification of the equitable defense of
unclean hands); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 812 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("Indeed, what we have termed 'inequitable conduct' is no more than the unclean hands
doctrine applied to particular conduct before the PTO."); Robert D. Swanson, The Exergen
and Therasense Effects, 66 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698-700 (2014).
94. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (1952).
95. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals is a predecessor court to the Federal Circuit. See also JP Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex
Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Chief Judge Markey linking inequi-
table conduct to unenforceability reference in 35 U.S.C. § 282 and unclean hands).
96. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287.
97. Id.; JP Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559.
98. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287.
99. See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 954, 964 (2017); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006).
100. In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Inventors Act, resulting in sub-
stantial changes to Title 35 dealing with patent law. Leahy-Smith America Inventors Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
Congress added a supplemental examination procedure that may provide a process for patent
owner to cure inequitable conduct. 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2012) ("A patent owner may request
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There is nothing inherent in this equitable defense that dictates
such a complete bar.10 1 This "atomic bomb" or binary remedy re-
moves a great deal of discretion from the district court.10 2 Other
lesser remedies could be provided for inequitable conduct and could
be within the sound discretion of the district court.10 3 The Supreme
Court does not favor removing discretion in standards based in eq-
uitable doctrines.
10 4
Third, the intentional withholding of material information or
misleading the USPTO is at the heart of the unclean hands doc-
trine.10 5 However, each situation should be looked at in the context
of what occurred at the USPTO and the district court should have
discretion as to how to deal with the withheld information. The fact
that some cases may be worse than other does not change the na-
ture of this improper act but may alter how the court addresses uch
an act. A totality of the circumstances standard is appropriate
when there is no single deciding factor and the court should weigh
a number of factors in making a determination on a case-by-case
supplemental examination of a patent in the [USPTO] to consider, reconsider, or correct in-
formation believed to be relevant to the patent, in accordance with such requirements as the
Director may establish."). See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979)
(stating that under general principles of equity the "remedy imposed by a court of equity
should be commensurate with the violation ascertained."); Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1299
(O'Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("While we have held previously that
a finding of inequitable conduct renders unenforceable all claims of the wrongly procured
patent and, in certain circumstances, related patents, this singular remedy is neither com-
pelled by statute, nor consistent with the equitable nature of the doctrine."); Star Scientific,
Inc. v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Chief Judge Michel
noting that "[j]ust as it is inequitable to permit a patentee who obtained his patent through
deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of material information to enforce the patent
against others, it is also inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the patentee only
committed minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability or in good faith").
101. Cf. The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid rule that prosecution his-
tory estoppel barred all forms of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727-28 (2002). Equity per-
mits flexibility in the remedy to be imposed. Id. at 737.
102. Chief Judge Rader of the Court of Appeals explained in some detail that inequitable
conduct on the part of a patentee produces draconian results for the patent holder, especially
in comparison to patent invalidity. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288-89; see also supra Sec-
tion II. A successful invalidity defense will typically be directed at certain claims in an issued
patent but may not affect the entire patent. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288. In contrast, a
finding of inequitable conduct on the part of the patentee will result in the entire patent
being held unenforceable due to the unclean hands that underlies this doctrine. Id. Further-
more, a holding of unenforceability on a particular patent may infect and render unenforce-
able other patents in the chain, as well as other patents in the portfolio. Id. This is not the
case with invalidity. Furthermore, once a patent is held unenforceable, this may often lead
to viable antitrust and other related claims. Id. at 1289. Such antitrust claims will signifi-
cantly increase the cost of the litigation. Id. They can also increase the potential for en-
hanced damages being awarded against the patent holder. Id.
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391-92.
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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basis.106 A district court should be able to consider more than ma-
teriality and intent in its analysis in making an inequitable conduct
determination. By applying a totality of the circumstances stand-
ard, it would give the district court greater latitude in examining
the conduct of the patent holder before the USPTO. This is exactly
what equitable doctrines are meant to be used for in our jurispru-
dence. The reasoning in Octane is applicable to the standard for
inequitable conduct and it should be used in the inequitable conduct
context.
10 7
The majority in Therasense also discusses in great detail that its
most recent iteration of the inequitable conduct standard is based
on a policy goal of curtailing the proliferation of such claims in liti-
gation.10 8 Again, the Supreme Court has cautioned about the use
of policy to alter legal tests based in equity.10 9 As with Octane and
Halo Electronics, the Federal Circuit majority in Therasense has
developed a highly restrictive standard based on public policy is-
sues.110 This may be a laudable policy goal, but patent law stand-
ards based in equity that are too restrictive potentially run afoul of
the Supreme Court's treatment of such equity issues. This is ex-
actly what happened to Federal Circuit decisions in Octane, Halo
Electronics and eBay Inc.
111
Inequitable conduct is present in patent jurisprudence in order to
ensure that patent applicants that come before the USPTO do so
106. Cf., e.g., Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (the Supreme Court stating that
for probable cause it has "rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in
favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-
31 (1983) (addressing probable cause and stating that "[t]his totality-of-the-circumstances
approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid
demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip") (footnote omitted).
107. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 545 (2014) ("[A]n
'exceptional' case is simply one that stands out from others .... District courts may determine
whether a case is 'exceptional' in the case-by-case xercise of their discretion, considering the
totality of the circumstances. As in the comparable context of the Copyright Act, '[t]here is
no precise rule or formula for making these determinations,' but instead equitable discretion
should be exercised 'in light of the considerations we have identified."') (footnote omitted)
(quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)).
108. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also supra Section II.
109. See, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394.
110. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289. In Therasense, six of the participating Federal Circuit
judges join the majority opinion of then Chief Justice Rader. Id. Judge O'Malley concurred
in part and dissented in part. Id. Four judges dissented. Id. at 1282.
111. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (Federal Cir-
cuit's standard for enhancing damages is unduly rigid and hinders the district court's discre-
tion); Octane, 572 U.S. at 553 (the Federal Circuit's test for awarding fees in an exceptional
case is inflexible and does not provide enough deference to the lower court); eBay Inc., 547
U.S. at 394 (a rigid rule of granting a permanent injunction in patent cases eliminates the
district court's right to exercise its equitable discretion).
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with clean hands.112 Therasense is unduly narrow, restrictive, and
removes too much discretion from the district court to judge the con-
duct of the parties. The district court is often in the best position to
decide such issues and should be provided with greater flexibility.
The district court hears witnesses, makes credibility determina-
tions, and is much closer to the facts being litigated than an appeals
court.113
Judge O'Malley's separate opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, provides instructive guidance and a roadmap to the
potential problems and pitfalls with the majority's opinion in The-
rasense.114 In her opinion, Judge O'Malley noted that "[t]he essence
of equity jurisdiction [is] the power ... to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case."115  Judge
O'Malley goes on to state that the majority cites no authority "for
the proposition that inequitable conduct is somehow independent of
the unclean hands principles the Supreme Court described and ex-
plained in its trilogy of cases.' 116 In addition, the standard adopted
by the majority "delimit[s] and narrow[s] the contours of the un-
clean hands doctrine when applied to the application process before
the PTO" and does provide the district court with little flexibility in
judging inequitable conduct.117 In short, Judge O'Malley argued
that Therasense goes too far because it removes too much discretion
112. See Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319, 330 (1949) ("By reason of the nature of
an application for patent, the relationship of attorneys to the [USPTO] requires the highest
degree of candor and good faith."); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co.,
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) ("The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent,
therefore, give[s] the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct .... "); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012)
(providing the USPTO's present rule for duty of disclosure). See also MPEP § 2000 ("Duty of
Disclosure") for further guidance provided to patent applicants.
113. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 565 (1985) ("If the district court's
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of
appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact,
it would have weighed the evidence differently.").
114. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1296-1302 (O'Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
115. Id. at 1297 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). See
also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946) ("Equity eschews mechanical rules; it
depends on flexibility.").
116. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1298; see also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818-20 (1945) (The assignee prosecuted the patent application be-
fore the USPTO knowing that the inventor had lied about the date of invention and deliber-
ately kept this fact secret until after the patent was issued); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hart-
ford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240-41(1944), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976) (The USPTO, to the public's determent, issued a patent
based on manufactured evidence); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240,
243 (1933) (the patent applicant intentionally suppressed evidence of an invalidating prior
use including paying a witness to keep the details of the prior use secret).
117. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1298.
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and flexibility from the district court and narrows the scope of the
unclean hands doctrine pronounced by the Supreme Court in its
trilogy of cases.
118
This reasoning and analysis are mirrored in the Octane, Halo
Electronics, and eBay Inc. Supreme Court opinions, as well as gen-
eral principles of equity. Equity doctrines are typically not formu-
lated as rigid standards.119 Nor are they typically all or nothing
doctrines as is the case with the current standard for inequitable
conduct. Such doctrines are rooted in flexibility and discretion and
permit courts to review the issue at hand on a case-by-case basis
and this discretion should not be lightly departed from.120 As may
be expected, the Supreme Court has not set forth a precise standard
for application of the unclean hands doctrine. However, the Su-
preme Court's statement in Keystone that "[t]he equitable powers of
[the] court can never be exerted in behalf of [one] who has acted
fraudulently, or who by deceit or any unfair means has gained an
advantage" provides reasonable guidance as to how to approach this
equitable doctrine.121 This guidance instructs against the Federal
Circuit's all or nothing rigid approach to inequitable conduct.
The Supreme Court's elucidation of the unclean hands doctrine
provides a rich basis for a challenge to the Therasense standard.122
The Federal Circuit has arguably gone beyond the guidance pro-
vided by the Supreme Court.123 There are valid policy concerns
raised by the majority in Therasense. However, policy does not pro-
vide a basis for the Federal Circuit to arguably circumvent Supreme
118. See supra notes 115-16.
119. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (stating that
equity "principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act. As this
Court has long recognized, 'a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice
should not be lightly implied"'); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1970) ("In
selecting a remedy the lower courts should exercise 'the sound discretion which guides the
determinations of courts of equity,' keeping in mind the role of equity as 'the instrument for
nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims."); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) (dis-
cussing that "[t]he historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish ... and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity
has distinguished it.").
120. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245.
121. Id.
122. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (same senti-
ment about deference and quotes Octane); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553 (2014) (Federal Circuit test inflexible and not enough deference to
lower court); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391-92 (rejecting inflexible standard for injunctions).
123. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-16
(1945); see also James J. Schneider, Therasense-less: How the Federal Circuit Let Policy Over-
take Precedent in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 223,
232-34 (2012) (arguing that the Therasense standard contradicts Precision).
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Court precedent.124 Therasense arguably ignores a large body of
historical equity jurisprudence.125 The Federal Circuit should re-
consider its standard on inequitable conduct and modify the ineq-
uitable conduct test to some test or standard that is more akin to
unclean hands. A test based more closely on the unclean hands
doctrine could both be flexible and provide district courts with a
great deal of discretion as to what facts to look at, and also at the
same time, set a high bar for a lower court to determine inequitable
conduct.126 Such a test would certainly include "intent" and "mate-
riality" elements, but would also allow the district court to look on
a case-by-case basis at whatever other factors the district court
thinks are important to decide if the duty of disclosure has been
intentionally circumvented. In short, the lower courts should have
greater discretion as to what it considers in inequitable conduct
claims, but it should be made clear that the patentee must have
acted in a manner that shows unclean hands before the lower court
can exercise its discretion.
If the Federal Circuit is not willing to reexamine its standard,
then the Supreme Court should consider providing uidance as to
what the standard should be for a review of inequitable conduct. It
has been around seventy years since the Supreme Court has last
visited unclean hands or inequitable conduct in a patent context.
As case law develops under Therasense in lower courts and inequi-
table conduct defenses continue to be a too common occurrence in
patent litigation, the Supreme Court, or the Federal Circuit, may
be provided with an incentive to revisit this important patent doc-
trine. 12
7
124. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (O'Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Policy concerns cannot,
however, justify adopting broad legal standards that diverge from doctrines explicated by the
Supreme Court. A desire to provide immutable guidance to lower courts and parties similarly
is not sufficient to justify the court's attempt to corral an equitable doctrine with neat tests.").
125. See, e.g., Anenson & Mark, supra note 13, at 1452-53 ("Since its inception in 1982,
the Federal Circuit has paid little attention to the doctrine's equitable tradition. Hence,
while Supreme Court equity jurisprudence still uses tradition as a principle to interpret eq-
uitable remedies and defenses, the equitable basis for inequitable conduct has been lost in
translation.") (footnotes omitted).
126. See, e.g., Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245-46 (discussing application of the unclean hands
maxim and stating that a court is "not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation"
that limits the court's discretion); see also Anenson & Mark, supra note 13, at 1458-61 (stat-
ing that unclean hands is not a rigid formula).
127. See generally Gideon Mark and T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker
Process Claims After Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 361, 381-
82 (2014).
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V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, the Federal Circuit has modified the standard for
determining inequitable conduct several times. To date, none of
these modifications, including Therasense, have been particularly
effective for reducing allegations of inequitable conduct in patent
litigation. The Federal Circuit should reconsider its inequitable
conduct standard and should develop a standard that is more con-
sistent with the unclean hands principles set out in Supreme Court
case law. If the Federal Circuit is not willing to reexamine its ineq-
uitable conduct standard, then the Supreme Court should consider
granting certiorari in an appropriate case and provide guidance on
how lower courts should determine inequitable conduct. Some
form, or a hybrid, of a totality of the circumstances standard that
gives greater deference and flexibility to the district court's findings
and conclusions is a reasonable starting point.


